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FTC Enforcement Authority in the Modern
Era: A Commission in Crisis?
Brandon Mantilla
Abstract
This note provides a brief history of the Federal Trade
      
           -splitting
decision in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC. As the Supreme
Court prepares to tackle questions surrounding authority to seek
monetary relief, I contextualize how enforcement authority has
historically been derived before analyzing how the issue may be
resolved. Doing so involves engaging several cases that may
prove consequential in determining the outcome and outlines
potential legislative solutions to the battle over restitution. Before
arriving at the most likely scenarios, a view of the budding
relationship between consumer protections giants the FTC and
Consumer Financial Protections Bureau (CFPB) provides
potential for a synergistic solution, but uncertainty surrounding
both institutions indicates a murky outlook on a purely
administrative resolution. This in-depth dive, breaking down
various aspects of the administrative predicament, details the
common law history of traditional restitution authority in the
FTC, examines challenges facing the FTC and CFPB, and
explores how similar issues facing the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) may affect FTC enforcement authority.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress has long sought to protect consumers and has tasked the
               
preventing violations of consumer protections laws, among other duties.
This goal has expressed itself in various forms over time, as the law has
adapted to fit changing eras in the realm of consumer protections. It has
resulted in case law that expanded executive authority, the rise of the
Consumer Financial Protections Bureau in response to financial crisis, and
a cooperative, symbiotic administrative relationship between the fledgling
agency and the FTC.
Recently, however, a judicial trend favoring less expansive
interpretation of congressionally granted authority has emerged.
Established, historically unchallenged authority largely and liberally
granted to federal agencies, has come under fire by textualist and
structuralist legal minds. In practice, the elimination of enforcement tools
seen as customary for decades has the potential to result in millions of
dollars lost due to a drop in operational efficiency and monetary relief.
Thus, Congress, administrative officials, members of the judiciary, and
consumers at large await the resolution of this conflict in approach to
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statutory interpretation begun in Kokesh v. SEC, carried over into FTC v.
Credit Bureau Center, and likely culminating either in the chambers of the
Supreme Court or the meeting rooms on Capitol Hill.

II.

BACKGROUND ON THE FTC

The FTC Act has protected consumers from unfair or deceptive acts
  " 
&
from simply business competition and the prevention of the growth of
monopolies.1

Investigative Authority
! !  #$  
compile information concerning, and to investigate . . . the organization,
business, conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership,
or corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce, excepting
banks, savings and loan institutions . . . Federal credit unions . . . and
common carriers . . . %2 More specifically, in cases involving deceptive
 
 $     % 
existing documents, oral testimony, or written answers to questions.3
    
&  #
entities to file annual reports on their business or other practices or conduct
investigative studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose
under Section 6(b).4 These demands can be contested and reviewed by a
court.5 Section 21(b) allows internet service providers and other similar
entities to voluntarily inform the FTC about potential violations without
liability.6 Beyond domestic powers, the Commission can use all of its
investigative tools to help foreign law enforcement agencies in consumer
protections matters under section 6(j).7

1

Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act:
Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1992).
2
15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2020).
3
F.T.C., A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commissions Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-wedo/enforcement-authority (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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Enforcement Authority
    rity to enjoin deceptive or unfair acts or
practices arises from section 5(a).8 
        
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer
          9 On the other hand, an unfair
          
is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
         10
One method the FTC uses is its power to conduct adjudicative
proceedings.11 Firstly, however, the Commission must have reason to
believe someone has violated a law.12 Once this standard has been met, a
complaint is issued detailing the charges.13 Next, the defendant can elect
to settle, singing a consent agreement that does not admit fault, consent to
entry of a final order, and wait thirty days for a decision on whether the
order becomes final.14 Otherwise, defendants may contest the charges.
When this occurs, an adjudicative proceeding reminiscent of a trial result
in an initial decision which recommends dismissal or issuance of a ceaseand-desist order.15 Respondents may appeal to any United States court of
appeals with jurisdiction.16 If the court of appeals upholds, it then issues
its own enforcement order.17 Either party may then file a petition for writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court.18
Commission orders become final sixty days after they are issued, and
a violation of a final order may result in a civil penalty being levied against
 
           
     
knowledge that such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful. 19
Under section 19, if a reasonable person would consider the violating
conduct fraudulent or dishonest, the Commission may pursue redress for
any injuries consumers may have suffered.20

8

Id.
James C. Miller, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, F.T.C. (Oct. 14, 1983),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptions
tmt.pdf.
10
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2020).
11
See F.T.C., supra note 3.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2) (2018).
20
Id. § 57b(a).
9
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Most often, however, the FTC exercises its authority under section
13(b) to pursue permanent injunctions issued directly by a court, skipping
the adjudicative proceeding altogether.21 Section 13 also, the Commission
believes, grants it to seek various kinds of monetary relief such as
rescission or restitution, along with injunctive relief.22 Due to its
         he section in its efforts
to protect consumers.23
FTC rulemaking authority on unfair and deceptive acts is derived from
section 18 of the FTC Act, which allows the Commission to create rules
           or deceptive
     24 These rules must allow for
limited cross-examination in an informal hearing and the Commission
must demonstrate why it considers a targeted practice to be prevalent.25

Enforcement Tools
The agency operates by issuing cease-and-desist orders to enjoin
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. However, because these orders did
not serve as effective deterrents, the FTC began to claim that it had the
power to order restitution for consumers victimized by unfair practices.26
Although courts never agreed, with the only court to consider the issue
                    
adding section 13(b) to the FTC Act with the intention of allowing
preliminary or permanent injunctions against violators of section 5 of the
Act.27
Initially, the FTC did not utilize section 13(b) as it does today. On the
contrary, the agency was criticized by the General Accounting Office for
failure to take advantage of the newly enacted amendment.28 Meanwhile,
it continued to push for an interpretation of the cease-and-desist power that
included the power to order restitution.29
Subsequently, Congress enacted section 19 of the Act.30 One year after
section 13(b) was enacted, this new section finally granted the FTC
express power to collect restitution for victims, provided the agency can
meet certain standards of proof and a statute of limitations. The
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30



F.T.C., supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2).
F.T.C., supra, note 3.
Ward, supra note 1, at 1142.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id. at 1142.
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introduction of section 19 clear$ '  
that section 13(b) did not provide for consumer redress. Section 19,
"!"  $  $ '   
interpreted section 13(b) to grant ancillary equitable relief power to the
FTC in conjunction with injunctions.31 The spread of the implied power to
receive remedies such as restitution and rescission through section 13(b)
left section 19 essentially redundant. The path to restitution carved out by
the judiciary has thus allowed   " $  '#
proof and statute of limitations requirements for decades.32
The differences between the two sections are unsurprisingly
substantial. The FTC has relied on section 13(b) and would be forced to
drastically change its approach to enforcement if the judiciary removed
the tool it granted the agency over three decades ago. To grasp the potential
ramifications of such a decision, one must first look to the language of the
statute.

Section 13(b)
Section 13(b) authorizes the
   %   $  
    $  &   !    
%  &  % $  
[that] is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by
    &33

Section 19
  !   %        . . .
[which] may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation
of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, [and] the payment
  &  ! -issued final cease and desist
orders or any rule regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices.34 This
section, however, includes a statute of limitations barring actions brought
% $   ! &35
In all, section 19 would place a heavier burden on the FTC to prosecute
cases quickly and provide more evidence than the lower standard of proof
required for a preliminary injunction under section 13(b). This burden
would bar a significant amount of the claims brought by the agency,

31
32
33
34
35



Id. at 1143.
Id.
15 USC § 53(b)(2) (2018).
Id. § 57b(b).
Id. § 57b(d).
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possibly forcing it to rely on its own slow-moving administrative
adjudication process in place of restitution granted in federal courts.36

   
 !       '   (  
complex and arduous. This adjudication proceeding includes precomplaint investigation, rapid fact and expert discovery, pretrial motions,
lengthy trials similar to bench trials in federal courts, filing of voluminous
last reply findings by the parties, a nonbinding initial decision, a complex
appeal process, and a potential appeal to a circuit court of appeals that
generally defers to the Commission.37 Resorting to this option would be
costly and inefficient for the FTC, possibly leading more defendants to
    )  ##!

Singer and Amy Travel
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in FTC v. H.N. Singer
 &!!    ! )# 
grant restitution as part of a permanent injunction in section 13(b) cases,
    )        !  %38 This
!   $  )  ! !  %!
section 13(b). The Seventh Circuit plainly recognized this right in 1989
with its holding in FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc.
In Amy Travel, the Seventh Circuit relied on Singer and a pair of prior
Seventh Circuit cases, FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc. and
FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc.39 In World Travel, the court was permitted to
grant interlocutory relief as well as permanent injunctive relief, while in
   !  !      !  # '
with it the power to issue whatever ancillary equitable relief is necessary
to the effective exercise of the granted power.40 In no unclear words, the
% " ! !%      '  !  
13(b), the statutory grant of authority to the district court to issue
permanent injunctions includes the power to order any ancillary equitable

36

Kelley Drye, Section 13 (b)log: Business As Usual? FTC Practice in the Wake of
Shire ViroPharma and Credit Bureau Center, AD LAW ACCESS (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/10/articles/section-13-blog-business-as-usual-ftcpractice-in-the-wake-of-shire-viropharma-and-credit-bureau-center/.
37
See generally J. Robert Robertson, Administrative Trials at the Federal Trade
Commission in Competition Cases, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 101, 105, 112 (2013).
38
FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982).
39
FTC v. Army Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989).
40
FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. World Travel
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1989).
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                 #41 The
            "  
    #            
restitution in all Seventh Circuit section 13(b) cases.
Amy Travel$              
circuit courts of appeal, including the Eleventh Circuit in FTC v. Gem
Merchandising Corp., the Eighth Circuit in FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin &
Bullion Corp., the Second Circuit in FTC v. Bronson Partners LLC, the
Tenth Circuit in FTC v. Freedom Communications Inc., the Ninth Circuit
in FTC v. Pantron I Corp., and the Fourth Circuit in FTC v. Ross. Until
recently, the position has gone largely unchallenged. However, a few
recent cases, especially FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, stand to
change the way the FTC approaches its enforcement authority. The next
section of this paper will discuss Credit Bureau Center in depth,
demonstrating why it poses a large, looming threat to the FTC not just in
the Seventh Circuit, but across the entire nation.

III.

FTC V. CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC

Factual Background
Credit Bureau Center is a credit-monitoring service owned by Michael
Brown.42 This service attracted customers by automatically enrolling them
in a $29.94 monthly subscription upon application for the supposedly free
credit report and score service.43 This fact was buried in a disclaimer in
small font Customers were not alerted of their enrollment until they
received a letter notifying them after they had already been enrolled.44
Meanwhile, Brown contracted Danny Pierce, who then subtracted
Andrew Lloyd, to advertise false rental properties on Craigslist and
   !$   
credit score.45 After generating $6.8 million in revenue and failing to offer
refunds (instead often offering reduced prices in an attempt to keep the
customer subscribed to his service), Brown was found liable and a
permanent injunction was issued and upheld. 46 The opinion takes the
  $     
different direction.47
41
42
43
44
45
46
47



Army Travel Serv., 875 F.2d at 571.
FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 766.
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A Statutory Breakdown
Jud '""#$!#,"'""'!"#!(###
FTC has not only section 13(b) at its disposal, but quick enforcement under
section 19 as well, which may have expressly granted the agency the
ability to seek restitution payments.48 Quickly shifting to a breakdown of
section 13(b), the court comes to its primary argument ) the language of
section 13(b) does not provide for a restitution remedy and the FTC Act
does not lend itself well to the interpretation of an implied restitution
remedy stemming from section 13(b). The court notes the nature of
restitution as a remedy for past actions rather than one intended to prevent
 ! $#$! %#" " # *%#+ ! *$# # %#+
language indicates.49 The conclusion that the ability to receive restitution
for past violations depends on whether present or future violations are
occurring does not sit well with the court, as one might expect, and exposes
!#&#
,"#!!##"#50
In continuance of its textualist approach, the court points to the
"&!##!%*"$#!$!#! $#!
"#'!!#+*#!$'!!#$!!!#'+
#
 #,""""#&!"#!spectively.51
    *# !&!+  !" # #!

enforcement tools, in addition to its striking lack of any mention of
additional equitable remedies, strongly indicate that section 13(b) was
never intended to grant the same powers as do the other tools.52

 #,"*"%$"+"#"%!"##$#!'
#!"#"*##"#!'+#"%"&#"%$""
and saving clauses can only preserve existing remedies.53 The court does,
however, see a role for each enforcement mechanism. Cease and desist
&!" *#!# %$ %#"+ "#  *! #'
!""" &"! $! ! #% !#"+  "# 
*"# $#$!%#"+54 In order to reach this
result, the court must first revisit its past rulings on the issue at hand in the
wake of the Supreme Court rulings issued since Amy Travel.

48

Id. at 771.
Id. at 772.
50
Id. at 773.
51
Id. at 773 (quoting § 45(1) (2018); §57(b)(b) (2018)).
52
Id. at 774.
53
See id. at 775 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. V. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426,
446).
54
Id. at 774.
49
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The Impact of Meghrig
After a brief rundown of the caselaw that resulted in Amy Travel, the
court explains a trend, in its view, that has reigned the expansive implied
restitution remedies of Porter v. Warner Holding Co., Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., and Amy Travel back in.55 This trend is best
exemplified by t  %Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., a case somewhat similar to Credit Bureau Center.
Meghrig centers on whether a provision of the Resource Conservation
  " !!# $
order p! ! #  
 " "$ !    
clean-up costs.56 Because these remedies are forward-looking, prohibitory
and mandatory injunctions rather than remedies for past costs, the Court
in Meghrig declined to recognize an implied restitution remedy.57
The Meghrig court also looked to some familiar factors in determining
that no implied restitution remedy existed. It looked to statutory
prerequisites for imminence of the danger and a mechanism that halts
citizen suits if the government pursues action and requires a ninety-day
notice before the suit.58 These factors and a lack of statutes of limitations
or reasonable cost requirements textually lead to a conclusion that the
section is not a restitution mechanism, but a solely injunctive one.59 Since
Meghrig, Judge Skye posits, the Supreme Court has ceased the
presumption of congressionally authorized judicial supplementation of
remedies, and now views express provision of one form of enforcement to
mean the preclusion of others.60
The Seventh Circuit believes Meghrig limited the impact of the old
line of cases on implied restitution essentially to their facts and every
reason Meghrig was decided as it was applies here.61 The textual reading
and structuralist view of each statute shows in each that the plain meaning
does not support restitution and other sections of the statute serve the role
courts have tried to pigeonhole section 13(b) into.62 As in Meghrig, a
temporal requirement of current events should not logically be a
prerequisite for restitution.63 %    

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63



See id. at 780.
Id. (quoting § 6972(a)).
Id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996))
Id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)).
Id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)).
See id. at 772.
Id. at 782-83.
Id. at 783.
Id.
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and notice requirement strike again as factors toward a conclusion that
restitution has not been authorized, implicitly or otherwise.64
Credit Bureau Center concludes its analysis by failing to find a
material distinction between the case at hand and Meghrig based on the
identity of the plaintiff as a state actor, and acknowledging that stare
decisis and the initiation of a circuit split are not sufficient reasons to
uphold the restitution remedy.65 Instead, the court prioritizes respect for
the role of Congress in legislating and the language of statutes.66 In the
eyes of the Seventh Circuit, Meghrig has made Amy Travel $   %
with the FTC Act.67

IV.

A BROADER PROBLEM FOR THE FTC

FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc.
As acknowledged in the majority opinion in Credit Bureau Center, the
&    
other circuit courts, as well. Although FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc. is a
competition case and not a consumer protections case, the Third Circuit
 $ %$  %
language of section 13(b). That court found that   ! $
  !    %
  !     $        
    %68

FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC
This case was decided in favor of the FTC. However, a separate
concurrence has raised some interesting concerns for the FTC. Along with
many of the same concerns expressed in Credit Bureau Center, the AMG
concurrence believes that Kokesh v. SEC $    
reasoning: that restitution under §   $ %!  %69
In Kokesh, the Supreme Court ruled that disgorgement " a form of
restitution#by the SEC was a penalty rather than an equitable remedy.70
This opens the door for an entirely diff   &
64

Id. at 783-84.
Id. at 785-86.
66
Id. at 775.
67
Id. at 786.
68
FTC v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 153 (3rd Cir. 2019).
69
FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018) (O&Scannlain,
J., concurring).
70
Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017).
65
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reasoning that restitution is available under section 13(b) as an ancillary
equitable remedy. AMG has since been granted writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court, allowing the Court to decide whether the holding of the
Ninth Circuit in AMG Capital Management or the Seventh Circuit in
Credit Bureau Center will prevail.

V.

THE CFPB

History
Following the financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. One effect of the legislation
was the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a federal
agency conceived by Senator Elizabeth Warren during her years as a
professor. The agency aims to protect consumers from unfair, deceptive,
and abusive practices through enforcement of consumer financial
protection laws.71  !        
unions with over $10 billion in assets, as well as many nonbank consumer
financial service providers, such as mortgage lenders and servicers,
student lenders and servicers, payday lenders and certain participants in
            72
The agency is a compilation of various functions and responsibilities
previously separated among different groups finally shifted under one
governing body.73 It receives funding from the Federal Reserve, has a
director appointed to a five year term who is not accountable to the
president and requires a steep showing of cause for removal, and executes
its daily functions with little oversight.74 Beyond regulation, the CFPB can
                  
          75 With its sights set on
improving protections for the most vulnerable, the CFPB has
accomplished a number of valuable feats including but not limited to the
creation of a financial database allowing consumers to research loan
companies as well as new rules for mortgage and payday loans.76

71

Jon Eisenberg, An Early History of the CFPB: Part 1, LAW 360 (Mar. 18, 2014)
(available via LexisNexis).
72
Id.
73
Daniel Bush, What is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, anyway?, PBS
(Nov. 27, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/whatis-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-anyway.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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CFPB enforcement relief often includes: orders barring continuing
and future violations, including cease and desist orders or injunctions;
governance and review of the offending areas, often consisting of a review
of the compliance program used by the product or services and
improvement of procedures designed to prevent future violations, usually
involving a mandate to retain outside consultants and to report to the board
and CFPB; restitution paid to consumers harmed, potentially reviewed by
a third-party; and payment of a civil money penalty.77 Violators often are
required to have all board members assume full responsibility for ensuring
the integration of proper procedures in avoidance of future violations.78

Restitution
The CFPB has been granted statutory authority to seek remedies
including   disgorgement or compensation for unjust
              
         79 These remedies far exceed those
authorized for many administrative agencies, notably the aforementioned
FTC and SEC. In fact, the CFPB requires payment of restitution in most
cases it settles.80

An Unfriendly Welcome
             
Concerns regarding the constitutionality of its single-director structure and
vague, ambiguous language dictating its core responsibilities have
surrounded the agency since its inception. Many of the central designs,
including its exemption from congressionally apportioned funding, lead
enforcer who cannot be fired by the executive branch at will, and deference
received from courts, have been under fire since its inception.81 These
aspects arguably violate the separation of powers doctrine in their attempt
to keep the agency politically impartial. These arguments have played out
in courtrooms.
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB is set to determine critical issues for the CFPB
going into the future. Primarily, the case will determine whether the
                

77

Jon Eisenberg, An Early History of the CFPB: Part 2, LAW 360 (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://www.law360.com/articles/517133/an-early-history-of-the-cfpb-part-2.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Iain Murray, The Case Against the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://cei.org/content/case-against-cfpb.
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power within the executive branch.82 A potential ruling determining the
structure unconstitutional creates increasing uncertainty on the future of
the Bureau. If the structure is improper, as even CFPB director Kathy
Kraninger now argues, the Supreme Court must decide how to rectify the
issue.83 The Court must determine whether it can sever the violating
provision, 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), from the Dodd-Frank Act.84 If the
structure is unconstitutional, not only could its independence be at stake,
but its ability to operate at all in its present form due to enforcement actions
being led by an unconstitutionally appointed director.
However, the Court can extend its decision even further. In CFPB v.
RD Legal, U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska held that severability clauses
do not permit courts to rewrite statutes, and the Supreme Court may agree
that to simply sever the violating provision would be judicial overreach.85
In that event, the CFPB could be struck down in its entirety.86

VI.

HOW THE FTC AND CFPB INTERACT

Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act
The FTC, even before the creation of the CFPB, did not have
regulatory authority over consumer protection with regards to banks and
credit unions.87 In creating the CFPB, the Dodd-Frank Act shifted
consumer protections authority over banks and credit unions from federal
           88
Dodd-Frank, however, gave the CFPB other responsibilities as well. The
CFPB also has jurisdiction over any company involved in offering or
providing a consumer financial product or service as well as companies
who are service providers to those that offer or provide consumer financial
products or services.89 This shift in authority from the FTC to the CFPB
82
Kelsey Ramírez, Supreme Court to Determine CFPB Constitutionality in March,
HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/supreme-court-todetermine-cfpb-constitutionality-in-march/.
83
See id.
84
Id.
85
Alison Frankel, CFPB Just Told SCOTUS its Unconstitutional. What Does That
Mean for its Mission?, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cfpbstanding-lawsuit/cfpb-just-told-scotus-its-unconstitutional-what-does-that-mean-for-itsmission-idUSKBN1W32UJ.
86
Id.
87
CFPB Monitor, How the CFPB and FTC Interact (part 1), BALLARD SPAHR LLP (July
7, 2011), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2011/07/07/how-the-cfpb-and-theftc-interact-part-i/.
88
Id.
89
Public Law 111-517, Title X, §1002(6).
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Act and similar federal consumer financial laws against companies.90 The
       ow include sole authority to
enforce laws regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices and concurrent
jurisdiction with the CFPB in enforcing the Fair Credit Reporting Act.91
The two agencies are also tasked with coordinating with each other
throughout the rulemaking process.92 They must negotiate with the goal of
avoiding duplicate or conflicting rules.93 This shall be handled by
consulting each other prior to each rule proposal grounded in concurrent
             94 Interestingly,
the CFPB is permitted to enforce rules on unfair or deceptive acts or
practices that rely on FTC authority, and vice versa.95    
expanded remedy arsenal allows the federal government to pursue
remedies the FTC has never had explicit authority to seek, and is not
        

FTC-CFPB Memorandum of Understanding
The FTC and CFPB are required, by statute, to come to an agreement
regarding how to handle concurrent jurisdiction.
The Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission shall negotiate an
agreement for coordinating with respect to enforcement actions by each
agency regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial products
or services by a covered person . . . or service providers thereto. The
agreement shall include procedures for notice to the other agency, where
feasible prior to initiating a civil action to enforce any Federal law
regarding the offering or provision of consumer financial products or
services.96
In that agreement, the two governing bodies agree to conduct joint
investigations and share resources where appropriate. They also agree to
discuss legal issues presented in enforcement actions at least once per year
in order to ensure a consistent approach is maintained in enforcing
consumer protections laws.97 The agencies, in an effort not to initiate
90

CFPB Monitor, supra note 87.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Title X, Section 1024(c)(3)(A).
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Memorandum of Understanding Between The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
And The Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/ftccfpb_mou_225_0.pdf.
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double enforcement against violators, must maintain records of
investigations and enforcement matters so that they may inquire of each
other and receive a prompt response on what action, if any, has been taken
against a violator.98 This includes setting deadlines for reporting of the
commencement of investigations, filing of complaints, resolution of a
proceeding, and issuance of a no action letter.99 The agreement permits
each to intervene in a court proceeding initiated by the other on matters
within concurrent jurisdiction, so long as proper notice of intervention is
given.100
The agencies must notify each other prior to issuing rule proposals,
and meet once per year to discuss publication of policy statements,
bulletins, advisory opinions, and the like.101 When the agencies seek to
conduct examinations of covered entities, they are to coordinate
schedules.102 Upon termination, they share reports and confidential
supervisory information.103 Meetings are also held to coordinate strategy
and operations, including routing of complaints to proper recipients,
initiatives to inform and empower members of the military on consumer
financial products, discuss ongoing and anticipated research, and many
more objectives.104
The duo has already begun to work in concert for the specific purpose
                       
instance, the FTC and CFPB coordinated investigative efforts in a
proceeding against Equifax.105 There, the CFPB was able to use its
remedial authority to receive an order for $100 million in civil monetary
penalties.106 In response to potential loss of restitution authority, the FTC
could conduct more and more joint efforts with the CFPB in order to rely
on its authority.
However, this may not be an optimal solution in the long term.
Without proper authority to collect restitution of its own, the FTC could
come to rely on the CFPB to the point where the FTC no longer serves as
an efficient enforcer of consumer protections laws. In essence, the FTC
would be merely an investigative partner for the CFPB in cases involving
98
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101
Id. at 9.
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areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Because such a set up would likely bog
down both agencies and be poor use of federal resources, it is difficult to
imagine it as more than a short-term resolution while lawmakers seek to
 % ## " 
Additionally, there are many areas in which the sibling agencies do
not share jurisdiction. Laws regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices
fall solely with % #     
not rely on CFPB authority to pursue restitution. Ultimately, the FTC will
likely need to look toward a Supreme Court holding overturning Credit
Bureau Center or a legislative solution that more permanently solves the
issues surrounding Section 13b, as it will not find comfort under the wing
 %  #
Given the uncertainty regarding the status of the CFPB going forward
as well as the looming chipping away of enforcement tools facing the FTC,
the federal consumer financial protections landscape could possibly be on
the precipice of change and look vastly different within the next several
years.

VII.

SUPREME COURT OPPORTUNITIES TO SETTLE SECTION 13(B)

The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to settle the questions
surrounding the controversial FTCA section. The opportunity has arrived
via the aforementioned FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, which
decided Credit Bureau Center%  !  
Circu     %AMG Capital
Management "    #       %
enforcement authority under 13(b).107
Another pivotal case that could have shed light on the future of 13(b)
is Liu v. SEC. Although not a case that deals directly with section 13(b),
the issues and statute it grapples with it are similar enough that the
Solicitor General of the United States in a brief for AMG Capital
Management sought a stay of consideration in that case because the
 $  Liu overlap.108 The debate in
Liu    % #     
enforcement actions, a conversation first broached in Kokesh v. SEC. A
107

See FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (2018).
Brief for the Respondent at 7, FTC v. AMG Capital Management, LLC, 910 F.3d 417
(2018), No. 19-508 (Dec. 13, 2019); Leonard L. Gordon & Michael A. Munoz, Statutory
Dreams or Equitable Nightmares: A Trifecta of Cases Before the Supreme Court Threaten
the FTCs Enforcement Authority, ALL ABOUT ADVERTISING Law (Dec. 30, 2019),
https://www.allaboutadvertisinglaw.com/2019/12/statutory-dreams-or-equitablenightmares-a-trifecta-of-cases-before-the-supreme-court-threaten-the-ftcs-enforcementauthority.html.
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footnote from Kokesh, initiated the momentum that culminated in Liu,
noting that,
[N]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied
disgorgement principles in this context. The sole question presented in
this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement
actions, is subject to § # 109
This footnote opened the floodgates for what was to come, leaving
the question of whether disgorgement was a proper remedy under the
# "     " fendants in SEC enforcement
actions. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Liu held that disgorgement
 !  #  

victims are equitable relief permissible under §78u(d)(5). 110
The defendants in Liu garnered $27 million in funding from Chinese
investors as part of the EB-5 program allowing foreign investors to gain
entry into the United States in return for a substantial investment. 111
However, the defendants failed to properly invest the funds, instead
misappropriating a majority of the funds.112 Consequently, the SEC
sought and was granted disgorgement of the funds, and the district court
also issued civil penalty of $8.2 million, along with barring them from
participating in the EB-5 program in the future.113
Historically, the SEC has used disgorgement often and to great
effect.114 In fact, 74% of all monetary relief obtained by the SEC was
gained through disgorgement in 2019.115 Its use has not been questioned
for decades, despite never actually being explicitly authorized by
statute.116 Thus, Liu  "     #
enforcement approach.
However, as the Solicitor General noted, the relevant SEC statute is
"  "   # "
109
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Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. ___ (2020).
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arguments for how Congress has authorized disgorgement relies on the
Sarbanes-             !  
equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of
"117 Therefore, according to the SEC, disgorgement is
authorized as an equitable remedy.
Likewise, a more textualist approach similar to the one employed in
Credit Bureau Center by the Seventh Circuit, could acknowledge that
disgorgement (or restitution) is not an equitable remedy. If restitution is
deemed not to be an equitable remedy, as the Supreme Court decided of
disgorgement in Kokesh, it may be difficult for the FTC to argue that it
is implied as an ancillary equitable power accompanying its permanent
     #   
unclear, as the Court in Liu allowed the SEC to continue its
disgorgement practice with limitations, throwing the administrative
agency a lifeline of sorts.118 Thus, although the statutory issues in Liu,
AMG Capital Management, and Credit Bureau Center may seem
intertwined, the Supreme Court does not seem to have decided all three
in one fell swoop. Having vacated its prior grant of the petition in Credit
Bureau Center, the Court is preparing to cast final judgment on the
 #           AMG Capital
Management.119

VIII.

!

VERRULING" THE COURT, POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTIONS

Congress may have the final word on these issues, regardless of how
the Supreme Court rules. As a number of courts in the relevant cases have
discussed, Congress understands how to authorize these remedies
explicitly, and has done so in each statute. In the case of the FTC Act,
restitution is explicitly authorized in Section 19. This remedy is simply
117

15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5); Jonathan Rosenberg ET AL., Dismantling the SECs Federal
Court Disgorgement Authority, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/01/10/dismantling-the-secs-federal-courtdisgorgement-authority/?slreturn=20200023142928.
118
Kyle DeYoung ET AL., An Analysis of the Supreme Courts Decision in Liu v. SEC,
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less appealing to the Commission because it is subject to a statute of
limitations and requires administrative proceedings that take longer to
           
case for the SEC.120 If Congress is not satisfied with section 19 as a
remedial tool, it may amend the act to explicitly authorize restitution in a
more satisfactory manner.
Although legislation has not been put forth explicitly authorizing
expanded restitution for the FTC, largely because only one court of
appeals has ruled against the FTC, the same is not true for the SEC. Two
bills have been introduced in Congress in response to Kokesh.121 The first,
brought forth by Sens. Mark R. Warner (D-Va.) and John Kennedy (RLa.), would essentially cement Kokesh   122 The
bill would authorize a five-year statute of limitations for disgorgement and
a ten-year statute of limitations for restitution.123 The other bill, introduced
by Rep. Ben McAdams (D-Utah), would grant the SEC express
disgorgement authority by amending Section 21(d)(5) to explicitly allow
disgorgement rather than simply equitable relief.124
Far from the only examples of Congressional power to circumvent the
courts, these bills nonetheless provide excellent examples on what
Congress may do in the event of a Supreme Court ruling against the FTC,
and certainly the SEC. Despite the legislative process taking some time, a
legislative solution would likely prove to be the best option, as Congress
is the body of government with the most control. The FTC is created by
Congress, governed by legislature, and can be immunized from judicial
overreach with proper statutory drafting. With an express grant of
authority in clear, precise language, Congress could put the issue to rest
permanently.

IX.

CONCLUSION

The FTC is in the midst of a bureaucratic tornado, one it likely never
saw coming after decades of unchallenged enforcement activity. Its
authority to circumvent the burdensome administrative proceedings and
statutory restrictions by invoking section 13(b) has served a critical
function for the Commission. Without it, some confusion about how the
government may pursue enforcement against violators of consumer
120
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protection laws. Unless the FTC Act is amended, that objective may fall
 "   #! " " 
it a capable fill-in or ally to the FTC in its effort to protect consumers.
Given the political and legal criticisms and uneven entrance into the
stage as an emerging executive agency, the future of the CFPB is far from
certain. Questions surrounding its structure and constitutionality loom
large over the administrative landscape, making reliance on a mere shifting
of roles to the CFPB a difficult solution for the federal government to
embrace. Thus, a prudent approach may entail allowing the other branches
of government to settle the discussion amongst themselves.
In the short term, the discrepancy in FTC enforcement authority may
cause some trouble for the agency nationwide. Many defendants are sure
   # "  Credit Bureau Center.
Meanwhile, a similar battle rages on in regard to SEC enforcement actions.
As the issue of restitution and disgorgement await an impending
resolution, excessive litigation on the most basic issues look to hamper the
courts.
However, a number of resolutions may put an end to the confusion
surrounding 13(b). The judicial branch provides the promise of resolution
in the form of FTC v. AMG Capital Management, and may have laid the
groundwork for such in Liu v. SEC. The Supreme Court could end the use
of motions based on lack of authority facing the FTC with its decision in
AMG Capital Management. However, in the event that the Court decides
against the FTC, the climate may yet remain uncertain.
To maintain administrative efficiency and utility, Congress may seek
to    #
  "     #
industry-shifting decision. Whether in the form of bills currently making
their way through the halls of Congress or another bill designed to address
the concerns of a potential Supreme Court decision, the legislative branch
is likely to have final say on the matter if the Court does not.



